When Exactly Did Tuaspring's Operational Problems Start? - Hyflux

Disclaimer: I am not an investment advisor. Heck, i am not even working in the financial industry. Below are my interpretation and i am grateful if you will let me know if anything i say is wrong and i will correct it in a reasonable time. I am not an expert and don't wish to be assumed to be one. I make losses frequently.

When PUB is asked about Tuaspring's water capacity in relation to operational defaults and you are given such an answer.

You know you are not dealing with a "commerical decision"  anymore.  

It came as a surprise to many when Olivia Lum mentioned publicly for the first time to retail investors at the Townhall that only 10% of Tuaspring revenue is from water while the rest is from electricity. However, this was only mentioned after the court protection, so even if any investor were to do his due diligence on this new information, it is too late as Hyflux is already suspended from trading. Listen to this recording again.



I think it is important to highlight some important milestone dates of Tuaspring, an Integrated Water and Power Plant.

July 2011 - Tuaspring contruction begins. source here

September 2013 - Tuaspring started treating water. The power plant was still being constructed. source here

March 2016 - Tuaspring's power plant went online. Source here.

This means that Tuaspring has already started earning revenue from treated water alone in 2014 and 2015 as the power plant only came online in 2016. However,  i am unable to find disclosed information on Tuaspring's revenue in 2014 and 2015 in their annual reports or any corporate announcements on Hyflux website.

It is only in Annual Report 2017, where Tuaspring's revenue is finally revealed since Tuaspring is classsified as an asset for sale.

Finally Disclosed! Source

However, how much revenue is derived from electricity and how much is derived from water is still undisclosed. This information on Tuaspring revenue is still not helpful at all to the investor who wants to find out the actual water utilization of Tuaspring.

PUB's statement as per Straits Times

Multiple Occasions. Source

How Tuaspring's capacity is protrayed

Source

On Hyflux's website, Tuaspring's capacity is shown as 318,500 cubic metres a day.
I am unable to find any disclosed information on Hyflux website or corporate announcements that Tuaspring was required by PUB to treat any other capacity.

My Thoughts

An anonymous member in Telegram group provided me with the audited ACRA filings for Tuaspring. This filings showed the revenue earned by Tuaspring in 2014 and 2015.
Source here.  You will have to pay up to $76 dollars to get these filings.

It is very ridiculous that i am not able to find this information on the corporate announcements of Hyflux or in their annual reports. Imagine if a company has many subsidiaries, does it require one to pay up to $76 for each subsidiary to check their statements to see what is wrong? Besides, how does a mom and pop investor even know what to look for!

As Tuaspring went online with the water business first in 2013, revenue from 2014 and 2015 should only be related to water revenue and not mixed together with electricity revenue like in 2016 and 2017 where the power plant came online.

From ACRA filings

Lets do the maths

According to this source, the first year water price that is sold to PUB is 45 cents per cubic metres.
Let's assume that this is the same water price in 2014 , 2015, 2016 and 2017.

Capacity of Tuaspring as publicly stated at 318,500 cubic metres:

318,500 cubic metres per day X  365 days X $0.45 per cubic metres = $52 million

Utilization of Tuaspring water capacity  in 2014 (based on ACRA):

revenue from water = $13.3 mil

13.3 mil /52 mil = 25.6 % of stated capacity

Utilization of Tuaspring water capacity in 2015 (based on ACRA):

revenue from water = $18.8 mil

18.8 mil / 52 mil = 36.1% of stated capacity

Utilization of Tuaspring water capacity in 2016 (based on Annual report 2017 and 10% revenue from Olivia Lum):

revenue from water = 10% times 156 mil = $15.6 mil

15.6 mil/ 52 mil = 30% of stated capacity

Uilization of Tuaspring water capacity in 2017 ( as per calculations done before. Click here):

revenue from water = $17 million

17 mil / 52 mil = 33% of stated capacity

It can be seen above that the revenue from water and the capacity utilisation of Tuaspring  is pretty consistent through 2014 to 2017,  ranging from $13.3 million to $18.8 million revenue per year and 25.6% to 36.1% capacity utilization per year.

It must be noted that in 2014 and 2016, the derived capacity utilization is even lower than 2017.
Yet, PUB has stated  that Tuaspring " has failed to provide the required plant capacity on multiple occasions". " The defaults started since 2017..."
But the utilization in 2014 and 2016 is even lower than in 2017!

Some questions naturally arises from here.

1) Did Tuaspring fail to provide the required plant capacity as far back as 2014?

2) If yes, why did Hyflux continue to sell the $500 million perpetual securities to retail investors in 2016 knowing that there was already something wrong with Tuaspring and it being more than half the asset value of Hyflux ? Why wasn't this material information disclosed? 

3) Why did PUB only state that it occured since 2017?

4) Another possibility is that if PUB did not require Tuaspring to run at 100% utilization and instead run at a lower utilization with sufficient spare capacity as standby, just in case we need it, is this disclosed to investors? How will any investors cover their cost of investment if indeed this was the case? I am not sure if it is a coincidence but in 2015 when Tuaspring capacity utilization is at its highest at 36.1%, 2015 was also recorded as one of Singapore's top 10 driest years in history. Source here from government website. May this imply that the revenue earned by Tuaspring is also affected by the climate? Who would have known!

5) In a Straits Times forum post published on 19 Feb 2019 titled " How much did Hyflux Board know when they okayed retail bonds?" . Did they know already that the company would most likely be doomed to fail but still issued to mom and pop retirees who are the last to be sold a Hyflux toxic security?

The more one digs, its like opening a can of worms.

If material information is classified as confidential and not disclosed , how can any investor make any informed decision?

For PnP and MTN holders who wants to vote NO but are unable to attend the voting on 5th April 2019. You can fill up this form to proxy others. This has to be done by 31 March since 2 April is the deadline to give the forms to Boardroom, a Corporate Secretarial Company and some leadtime is necessary for the volunteers. 

Click here to let others vote NO on your behalf

VOTE NO!

Click here to support the PnPs Online Petition

Further reading

1) Considerations about Hyflux
2) The fate of Hyflux
3)Will Hyflux recover? The billion dollar question
4) Hyflux-Treatmeat of perpetual share holders- Ezion
5) Hyflux - loans and borrowings - Pacific Radiance
6)A happy ending for retail perpertual securities holders - Tiger Air and Hyflux
7) The Very Curious Case of Sharebuybacks- Hyflux
8)What did the founder/Chairwoman/CEO do to help hyflux throughout the years
9) Moving forwards at the Townhall meetings with Hyflux - Part 1
10) Moving forward at the Townhall meeting with Hyflux - Part 2
11)The Lucky Accredited Investors of Hyflux's Perpetual Securities - Part 3
12) The Peculiar Case of HyfluxShop - Question 12 
13)Uncovering the Real Motivations Behind the HyfluxShop 
14) High Level Staff Movement Indication of Red Flags -Hyflux
15)An industry comparison of Hyflux compared with its peers - Question 15
16)What other Water Companies did that Hyflux didn't - Question 16
17)Why a debt to equity option for retail investors is not right
18) Consolidated Questions For Hyflux Townhall Meeting on 19 and 20 July 2018 - Hyflux
19)Consolidated Questions For Hyflux Townhall Meeting on 19 and 20 July 2018 - Hyflux- continued
20)Informal Steering Committee for the Reorganisation Process - Hyflux
21) What happened to other Debt Restructuring Exercises - Ausgroup
22)What happened to other Debt Restructuring Exercises - Nam Cheong
23) My layman views of the so-called " White Knights of Hyflux"
24) The Unsecured Working Group (UWG) are against the retail investors - Hyflux
25)Where to find money to pay back retail investors? 
26)What happened at Hyflux's Second Townhall Meeting
27) Another bomb to the retail investors of Hyflux
28)The Underrated Importance of Regulatory Risk - Hyflux
29)The Overlooked Importance of Another Regulatory Risk - Hyflux
30)Why did so many Singaporeans invest in Hyflux - The positive image illusion
31)On Why The Rich Get Richer And Poor Gets Poorer - The Hyflux Proposal is Out!
32)The " not spoken much" dirty little thing about the Restructuring Proposal - the $33 million - Hyflux
33) The Failure of the much touted Public-Private-Partnership Model in Singapore - Hyflux

34)The Curious and Disturbing Default Notice of PUB- Hyflux
35) Why i Am Still Voting No to the Revised Offer - Hyflux 

36) The Wrong Impression of the Revised Offer- Hyflux

The Wrong Impression of the Revised Offer - Hyflux

Disclaimer: I am not an investment advisor. Heck, i am not even working in the financial industry. Below are my interpretation and i am grateful if you will let me know if anything i say is wrong and i will correct it in a reasonable time. I am not an expert and don't wish to be assumed to be one. I make losses frequently.

I think i have to correct the wrong impression that some people may have: that PnPs and unsecured banks/MTNs are sharing on a pro rata basis any of the upside that will happen if contingent liabilities were to be extinguished.

A short answer is there is some sharing going on. But actually its a NO. It is not on a prorata basis.

In my opinion, i think it can be quite misleading and many of the PnP mom and pop investers, especially the Pioneer or Merdeka generation may actually believe they are sharing with the unsecured banks on a prorata basis, making it seem fairer and hence making a wrong decision.

• The percentages % stated below are all based on the cash component held in escrow account as a standby for the contingent liabilities only. However, the amount held in escrow account as a standby for the contingent liabilities comprises of both cash and shares and not cash only.

ScreenShot of the letter via email to SIAs Chief. This was shared in Telegram by an anonymous poster

My best-effort infographics ( Note: I am not a financial advisor)

• Regarding the reduction of 20% to 10% for the management payout recipients. As in the letter above, the %percentage is again based on the cash component. This means the project leaders who are taking these incentives are not giving up half of their incentives.Instead, the management payout recipients got 72% ( 23.9/33.2 times 100%) of what they got originally , instead of half which many people thought instead. Read how this mainstream media writes about this. I think it gives a wrong impression, in my opinion.

My best effort Infographics ( Note: I am not a financial advisor)

• When the letter writes "pro rata basis" between Unsecured Scheme Parties and Debt Securities Scheme Parties, this pro rata isn't pro rata actually. It depends on what is categorized under these two Parties. Now that contingent liabilities that are extinguished are to be shared among these two parties BUT these contingent liabilities are categorised under Unsecured Scheme Parties to enlarge their base.  I reiterate again that contingent liabilities are not actual claims as they may not even happen at all. These contingent liabilities should not have been classified under Unsecured Scheme Parties in the first place at all because it "artificially" inflates their share of the extinguished contingent liabilities, from 53% to 65% and reduces the share for the Debt Securities Parties (PnPs) from 47% to 35%.

My Thoughts

I think its very unfortunate that a simpler way of providing the information was not given. It may also be construed by some skeptical people that it is meant to mislead the more helpless ones to think that this is even near to a fair deal at all. I think i will give Hyflux the benefit of the doubt.

 A much simpler way of presenting these scheme has to be shown. This is important as the bulk of the target audience 34,000 of them have many many pioneer and merdeka generations among them. It is already a challenge to read in english or read at all given their poor eyesight for many of the chinese educated ones. To be honest, i have immense difficulty reading and understanding the letter too and had to re-read it many times and i am not a financial advisor.

I urge greater clarity from Hyflux with simplified terms so that many of the 34,000 can make an informed choice on the 5th of April .
I wonder why they planned it on Qing Ming Festival a.k.a Tomb -Sweeping Day,.
Maybe, it's a sign.

For PnP and MTN holders who wants to vote NO but are unable to attend the voting on 5th April 2019. You can fill up this form to proxy others. This has to be done by 31 March since 2 April is the deadline to give the forms to Boardroom, a Corporate Secretarial Company and some leadtime is necessary for the volunteers. 

Click here to let others vote NO on your behalf

VOTE NO!

Click here to support the PnPs Online Petition

Further reading

1) Considerations about Hyflux
2) The fate of Hyflux
3)Will Hyflux recover? The billion dollar question
4) Hyflux-Treatmeat of perpetual share holders- Ezion
5) Hyflux - loans and borrowings - Pacific Radiance
6)A happy ending for retail perpertual securities holders - Tiger Air and Hyflux
7) The Very Curious Case of Sharebuybacks- Hyflux
8)What did the founder/Chairwoman/CEO do to help hyflux throughout the years
9) Moving forwards at the Townhall meetings with Hyflux - Part 1
10) Moving forward at the Townhall meeting with Hyflux - Part 2
11)The Lucky Accredited Investors of Hyflux's Perpetual Securities - Part 3
12) The Peculiar Case of HyfluxShop - Question 12 
13)Uncovering the Real Motivations Behind the HyfluxShop 
14) High Level Staff Movement Indication of Red Flags -Hyflux
15)An industry comparison of Hyflux compared with its peers - Question 15
16)What other Water Companies did that Hyflux didn't - Question 16
17)Why a debt to equity option for retail investors is not right
18) Consolidated Questions For Hyflux Townhall Meeting on 19 and 20 July 2018 - Hyflux
19)Consolidated Questions For Hyflux Townhall Meeting on 19 and 20 July 2018 - Hyflux- continued
20)Informal Steering Committee for the Reorganisation Process - Hyflux
21) What happened to other Debt Restructuring Exercises - Ausgroup
22)What happened to other Debt Restructuring Exercises - Nam Cheong
23) My layman views of the so-called " White Knights of Hyflux"
24) The Unsecured Working Group (UWG) are against the retail investors - Hyflux
25)Where to find money to pay back retail investors? 
26)What happened at Hyflux's Second Townhall Meeting
27) Another bomb to the retail investors of Hyflux
28)The Underrated Importance of Regulatory Risk - Hyflux
29)The Overlooked Importance of Another Regulatory Risk - Hyflux
30)Why did so many Singaporeans invest in Hyflux - The positive image illusion
31)On Why The Rich Get Richer And Poor Gets Poorer - The Hyflux Proposal is Out!
32)The " not spoken much" dirty little thing about the Restructuring Proposal - the $33 million - Hyflux
33) The Failure of the much touted Public-Private-Partnership Model in Singapore - Hyflux

34)The Curious and Disturbing Default Notice of PUB- Hyflux
35) Why i Am Still Voting No to the Revised Offer - Hyflux 

Why I Am Still Voting No To The Revised Offer - Hyflux

Disclaimer: I am not an investment advisor. Heck, i am not even working in the financial industry. Below are my interpretation and i am grateful if you will let me know if anything i say is wrong and i will correct it in a reasonable time. I am not an expert and don't wish to be assumed to be one. I make losses frequently.

On 8 March 2019, a revised offer to the retail perpetual and preference (PnP) holders was out. Read here. Straits Times wrote that the PnP holders are now able to get up to 7.4% in cash, meaning this 7.4% is not guaranteed and it is the best case scenario and the recovery may be lower than this. I am not sure how Straits Times calculated it but my calculation instead was up to 6.2% in cash, making the recovery for PnP 13.8% in cash and shares in the best case scenario.

Previous: Every $100 invested, get back $3 cash and $7.6 in implied share value ($10.60)   
Now: Every $100 invested, get back up to $6.20 cash and $7.60 in implied share value ($13.80)

Why I Am Still Voting NO

• Salim Group did not improve their offer in any way. The little pie is still the same and it is simply redistributed for the creditors and PnP holders to fight among themselves for the scraps. If one looks at the latest valuation of Hyflux post restructuring, based on the 1 March court affidavits. With the various creditors and PnP claims extinguished, the net asset value of Hyflux would be $1.1 billion. This means that Salim Group bought a company worth $1.1 billion at a price of $667 million in implied value. This means  Salim Group will have a  gain of 66% in implied value ( 444/667 multiply by 100%) post restructuring. It must be further noted that this $1.1 billion valuation is done during court moratorium, a distressed period and i would GUESS that the subjective assumptions or judgments used by the valuers would be very stringent such that $1.1 billion is a very conservative figure.

• The retail perpetual shareholder invested $500 million in May 2016 and in May 2018, this $500 million is gone. Just like that, within two years. If Hyflux is liquidated, it would be easier to check the books of the company to see if there was any foul play. I was told that the Board of Directors and Olivia Lum would no longer have as much resources to defend themselves in such an instance. It seems also that third-party funding in insolvency proceedings is already allowed in Singapore and if Hyflux is liquidated, this could be an option. Source here. I am still finding out more on how this works and whether it is similar to the USA where lawyers don't charge a fee but will get a percentage of any proceeds that is won. Of course, the proceeds are from the director's insurance or personal assets now.

• I am really dealing with incomplete information to make an informed choice. PUB has not commented on the compensation amount to Hyflux if they were to take over Tuaspring. It is very difficult for retail investors to make a decision when such material information is not released, with confidentiality always cited. This fiasco just cannot simply be a "commercial decision" and the oft used dirty word called  "RISK" wantonly used to easily justify the loss of $900 million of 34,000 PnP investors and as much as 16,000 ordinary shareholders who are all mainly Singaporean Citizens. If disclosures would compromise the national security of a Nation, then perhaps PPP companies should no longer be allowed to be listed on an exchange and sold publicly since there is inadequate information to measure "RISK". What most investors are now thinking is :  Could there be a higher recovery for PnP investors?. Accepting the proposal then would be destroying this chance, wouldn't it?

• I am also very disgusted by our regulatory body SGX and MAS. How can a dividend of perpetual securities be announced and also past it ex-dividend date and still not paid? This is the first time i am hearing this thing happen in Singapore. The total amount is more than $14 million owned to Perpetual Securities . Shouldn't SGX and MAS mandate that all listed companies in Singapore ring fence their dividends once the ex-dividend date has been passed, by putting it into an escrow account? How is there a fair and orderly market since ex-dividend date is a material information and many investors do use this information to invest?

18 May 2018 - Ex-dividend date

23 May 2018 - Court protection seeked

27 May 2018 - Dividend payable date

Source

I hope i have been using my head for the 3 points above. 

I have not even reached my heart yet. 

Pay Cut and Clawback of Salary 

When i am reading the affidavits and hearing from the ground, the staff morale in Hyflux is really low. Operational problems in other Hyflux projects has been mentioned by the mainstream media. 

It is very disgusting to me that the employees have been right sized, rental footprint has been reduced, assets sold off however, I could not find any mentioning of any pay cut or clawback of salary from Olivia Lum or Board of Directors. 

Despite calls for Olivia Lum to lead by example and reduce her pay since even before the first townhall ( based on what ordinary shareholders told me in their AGM) and repeatedly asked of her also during the every PnP townhall, she refuses. If one were to look at the dollar value of her salary only, one would say it would not make a difference to our recovery. I beg to differ. It does make a difference in staff morale which would eventually lead to higher recoveries.

A leader has to lead by example. 

Just looking at the amount of contingent liabilities that Hyflux has if it does not complete its projects properly, one will understand the absolute importance of STAFF MORALE. I would also go as far as to say that the 10% ( previously 20%) of management recipient payout to incentivise the project management to complete their projects properly could have been saved or reduced if STAFF MORALE had been higher. And i wonder how much of this 10% will be distributed to the rank and file employees to boost their morale.

If one is able to accept such VALUES, i think it would be easier to Vote Yes. I can't, hence i vote NO.

Hyflux Telegram Group for PnPs and MTNs

I am very inclined to agree with this anonymous poster.

February 28 - SIAS issued a letter on behalf of PnPs asking for a little more

March 8 - Letter stating that there will be an improved recovery

I can't imagine how fast they can get all the parties together to revise the offer in such a short time.
It seems to me like a psychological play to make retail PnP investors think they won a victory.

But the key takeaway from all this is.
The PnPs retail holders do have the mettle to go against the big boys and this is a good development for  Singapore. The general public who have been so vocal against the PnPs should ask themselves if they would like toxic securities , things that big boys don't want,  to be sold to the helpless retirees and the mom and pop investors without proper safeguards in place and inadequate disclosures. Also, big boys have money and resources, naturally the odds are stacked against the retail investors.

Who are you actually supporting when you are vocal against the PnPs?

For PnP and MTN holders who wants to vote NO but are unable to attend the voting on 5th April 2019. You can fill up this form to proxy others. This has to be done by 31 March since 2 April is the deadline to give the forms to Boardroom, a Corporate Secretarial Company and some leadtime is necessary for the volunteers. 

Click here to let others vote NO on your behalf

VOTE NO!

Click here to support the PnPs Online Petition

Further reading

1) Considerations about Hyflux
2) The fate of Hyflux
3)Will Hyflux recover? The billion dollar question
4) Hyflux-Treatmeat of perpetual share holders- Ezion
5) Hyflux - loans and borrowings - Pacific Radiance
6)A happy ending for retail perpertual securities holders - Tiger Air and Hyflux
7) The Very Curious Case of Sharebuybacks- Hyflux
8)What did the founder/Chairwoman/CEO do to help hyflux throughout the years
9) Moving forwards at the Townhall meetings with Hyflux - Part 1
10) Moving forward at the Townhall meeting with Hyflux - Part 2
11)The Lucky Accredited Investors of Hyflux's Perpetual Securities - Part 3
12) The Peculiar Case of HyfluxShop - Question 12 
13)Uncovering the Real Motivations Behind the HyfluxShop 
14) High Level Staff Movement Indication of Red Flags -Hyflux
15)An industry comparison of Hyflux compared with its peers - Question 15
16)What other Water Companies did that Hyflux didn't - Question 16
17)Why a debt to equity option for retail investors is not right
18) Consolidated Questions For Hyflux Townhall Meeting on 19 and 20 July 2018 - Hyflux
19)Consolidated Questions For Hyflux Townhall Meeting on 19 and 20 July 2018 - Hyflux- continued
20)Informal Steering Committee for the Reorganisation Process - Hyflux
21) What happened to other Debt Restructuring Exercises - Ausgroup
22)What happened to other Debt Restructuring Exercises - Nam Cheong
23) My layman views of the so-called " White Knights of Hyflux"
24) The Unsecured Working Group (UWG) are against the retail investors - Hyflux
25)Where to find money to pay back retail investors? 
26)What happened at Hyflux's Second Townhall Meeting
27) Another bomb to the retail investors of Hyflux
28)The Underrated Importance of Regulatory Risk - Hyflux
29)The Overlooked Importance of Another Regulatory Risk - Hyflux
30)Why did so many Singaporeans invest in Hyflux - The positive image illusion
31)On Why The Rich Get Richer And Poor Gets Poorer - The Hyflux Proposal is Out!
32)The " not spoken much" dirty little thing about the Restructuring Proposal - the $33 million - Hyflux
33) The Failure of the much touted Public-Private-Partnership Model in Singapore - Hyflux

34)The Curious and Disturbing Default Notice of PUB- Hyflux

The Curious and Disturbing Default Notice of PUB - Hyflux

Created by an anonymous person, not me, who shared in the Hyflux Retail Telegram group. PnP refers to the perpetual and preference share holders.

Disclaimer: I am not an investment advisor. Heck, i am not even working in the financial industry. Below are my interpretation and i am grateful if you will let me know if anything i say is wrong and i will correct it in a reasonable time. I am not an expert and don't wish to be assumed to be one. I make losses frequently.

Desalination is one of the 4 National Taps of Singapore. The importance of water cannot be overstated and can be summed up in a quote from our Late Mr Lee Kuan Yew.

" Every other policy has to bend at the knees for our water survival. Water is a precious resource; without it you die. You can live without energy....But without water you dehydrate and die."

Quote from Lee Kuan Yew

Let us do the maths.

• Olivia has stated that only 10% revenue is from water in the Townhall. You will have to plug in a earphone and turn up the volume to the loudest.

• In annual report 2017, the amount of Tuaspring revenue is $ 174 million , so water revenue at 10% of revenue is $17 million.

• It has been publicised that Tuaspring has a capacity of 318,500 cubic metre a day. 

• It has been stated in an article that the price of water in the first year is 45 cents per cubic metre  sold by Hyfux to PUB. 

• Total maximum water revenue from PUB if plant is ran at the target capacity of 318,500 cubic metres per day , for 1 year :

318,500 cubic metres per day X  365 days X $0.45 per cubic metres = $52 million

$17 million / $52 million = 33% of max capacity

• PUB has also stated publicly that Hyflux has failed to provide the required plant capacity on multiple occasions, and problems surfaced since 2017.

source here

• Tuaspring is currently the largest desalination plant in Singapore and it is supposed to bring in 70 mgd ( equivalent to about 318,226 cubic metres which is nearly the same as the stated 318,500 cubic metres stated as the capacity of Tuaspring) . Out of the current 130 mgd of desalinated water that Singapore has as stated in the info-graphics below, Tuaspring makes up more than half of our current desalinated water supply. This makes Tuaspring the elephant in the room. A very important strategic project.

My Thoughts

It is very disturbing to me as a Singapore citizen that our water supply is not a strong as it seems to be protrayed. Tuaspring, which is supposed to provide more than half of our current desalinated water supply seems only able to produce 33% of its capacity, 105,105 cubic metres a day instead of 318,500 cubic metres a day.

It is very shocking to me that the problems at Tuaspring was already known by PUB in 2017 and yet this was not disclosed, citing confidentiality.

It was written in a Straits Times article titled " Parliament. Investors urged to take only risks they can live with".

In it, Minister Ong Ye Kung said" Risks are inherent in investment...." [Investors] " ......need to pay close attention to what is disclosed, look beyond potential returns and assess if they can also accept the risks that come with specific investments" See here for the full article.
The article ended off with " We will continue to educate the investing public on the trade-off between risk and return through the MoneySense programme," said Mr Ong.

I do not think the issue of this failed Public-Private-Partnership project which is Tuaspring that resulted in the loss of up to 50,000 retail investors is a matter that can simply be solved with more education. Neither is it a matter about the investors not paying close attention to what is disclosed.

Rather, the real problem is the lack of material disclosures which are swept under the category of confidentiality. 
Even as of 7 March 2019, material information which is needed for retail investors to make a decision on the proposed restructuring is still withheld.

Source here.

How could the Hyflux retail investors make any informed choice when material information is not given, under the reason of confidentiality?

Why couldn't PUB disclose the operational defaults much earlier?

Why wasn't the revenue of Tuaspring segmented into electricity and water in their annual reports so that investors could see clearly that Tuaspring is actually a power plant in disguise, instead of an ancilliary power plant?

Why wasn't a shareholder mandate called for when there was a material change in business such that the risk profile of the Hyflux has changed drastically when a large percentage of their revenue is from electricity instead of their traditional water business ?

And to end off. I think that to calculate 33% as the operational output of Tuaspring may actually be very optimistic. This is because i used 45 cents per cubic metre which is the first year price in 2013. We do not know what is the actual price of treated water sold to PUB in 2017.

If we use a direct comparison approach with the 2 latest desalination plant that are in progress, the price of water sold to PUB is 91cents and 108 cents. Source here and here. Let's say the price in 2017 that Tuaspring sells to PUB is the average of the two prices at  99 cents per cubic metre.

The actual operational capacity of Tuaspring may actually only be 15% ( 47,045 cubic metres instead of 318,500 cubic metres a day). This is definitely a cause for national concern.

Minister Masagos in his speech in parliament in 2018 stated:

“Where we have allowed private sector participation via the DBOO model, safeguards are in place. PUB has adequate measures to ensure DBOO plants remain in operation and supply is not disrupted. It is a top strategic priority of the Government to keep our taps flowing.”
Source here.

Why wasn't the operational problems at Tuaspring highlighted then or earlier in 2017 during Parliament, since it is of paramount importance to the water security of Singapore?

I am even more determined to VOTE NO to the structuring which would risk a $0 recovery. This is because i think there are more problems that needs to be brought to light. 
By accepting the restructuring, we, the retail investors, are condoning future instances of such cases to happen again in our country.
By accepting the restructuring, all may be buried and this is no good for the nation of Singapore. 
My country and my home.

MERDEKA SINGAPURA!

And who gave Olivia Lum the 8 million** population projection as mentioned in first Townhall which resulted in her overconfidence to take on Tuaspring? Turn up the volume and use a earphone.
Be patient and wait for it.

**No replies for clarification has been received thus far from Hyflux Investor Relations.

Further reading

1) Considerations about Hyflux
2) The fate of Hyflux
3)Will Hyflux recover? The billion dollar question
4) Hyflux-Treatmeat of perpetual share holders- Ezion
5) Hyflux - loans and borrowings - Pacific Radiance
6)A happy ending for retail perpertual securities holders - Tiger Air and Hyflux
7) The Very Curious Case of Sharebuybacks- Hyflux
8)What did the founder/Chairwoman/CEO do to help hyflux throughout the years
9) Moving forwards at the Townhall meetings with Hyflux - Part 1
10) Moving forward at the Townhall meeting with Hyflux - Part 2
11)The Lucky Accredited Investors of Hyflux's Perpetual Securities - Part 3
12) The Peculiar Case of HyfluxShop - Question 12 
13)Uncovering the Real Motivations Behind the HyfluxShop 
14) High Level Staff Movement Indication of Red Flags -Hyflux
15)An industry comparison of Hyflux compared with its peers - Question 15
16)What other Water Companies did that Hyflux didn't - Question 16
17)Why a debt to equity option for retail investors is not right
18) Consolidated Questions For Hyflux Townhall Meeting on 19 and 20 July 2018 - Hyflux
19)Consolidated Questions For Hyflux Townhall Meeting on 19 and 20 July 2018 - Hyflux- continued
20)Informal Steering Committee for the Reorganisation Process - Hyflux
21) What happened to other Debt Restructuring Exercises - Ausgroup
22)What happened to other Debt Restructuring Exercises - Nam Cheong
23) My layman views of the so-called " White Knights of Hyflux"
24) The Unsecured Working Group (UWG) are against the retail investors - Hyflux
25)Where to find money to pay back retail investors? 
26)What happened at Hyflux's Second Townhall Meeting
27) Another bomb to the retail investors of Hyflux
28)The Underrated Importance of Regulatory Risk - Hyflux
29)The Overlooked Importance of Another Regulatory Risk - Hyflux
30)Why did so many Singaporeans invest in Hyflux - The positive image illusion
31)On Why The Rich Get Richer And Poor Gets Poorer - The Hyflux Proposal is Out!
32)The " not spoken much" dirty little thing about the Restructuring Proposal - the $33 million - Hyflux
33) The Failure of the much touted Public-Private-Partnership Model in Singapore - Hyflux

The Failure of the much touted Public-Private-Partnership Model in Singapore - Hyflux

Disclaimer: I am not an investment advisor. Heck, i am not even working in the financial industry. Below are my interpretation and i am grateful if you will let me know if anything i say is wrong and i will correct it in a reasonable time. I am not an expert and don't wish to be assumed to be one. I make losses frequently.

In 2004, the Ministry of Finance undertook a public consultation to seek views about the Public-Private-Partnership model. This initiative took root based on the studies about the successes of the PPP model in countries including the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Hong Kong and Canada.

And lo and behold, the poster girl to spearhead this PPP model was Ms Olivia Lum who was the "highlight of the Forum."

A list of FAQs about the PPP model was also crafted here.
In addition, a PPP handbook has been uploaded by MOF here.

In 2014, there was a drive to promote Singapore as Asia's Infrastructure Hub in a joint effort by the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the International Enterprise of Singapore.

The marketing materials for this is here.

My Thoughts

Tuaspring is meant to be a Public-Private- Partnership model between the government and Hyflux. Based on the PPP handbook released by the Ministry of Finance(MOF) in March 2012, the PPP model is structured as a Win-Win deal. It must deliver value for money to government and also present commercially attractive business opportunities for the private sector.

2.3.3 Similarly, for the private sector, there should be sufficient revenue, either from Government or directly from the users, to recover the initial investment and the costs incurred by the private sector.  - Quote from page 27 of the handbook

The problem with Tuaspring is that it is an integrated water and electricity project. Water comes under the Public Utility Board (PUB) while electricity comes under the Energy Market Authority (EMA). It is very strange indeed that Tuaspring is placed under the auspices of PUB when only 10% of Tuaspring's revenue comes from water while 90% comes from electricity, according to Olivia Lum in the first townhall. In addition, Tuaspring needed an electricity license given by EMA to run and so is governed by the Electricity Act. In my opinion, the demise of Tuaspring may be  symptomatic of  the lack of collaboration between the two agencies.

How then can it explain why Tuaspring, being a PPP project, meaning Hyflux should be able to recover the initial investment and costs , end up in this pitiful state?

How then did Singspring, the first PPP project, which deals solely with water, end up successful and as i understand is currently still profitable?

In my opinion, i think it was a mistake right from the start for PUB to award Tuaspring or to allow Tuaspring to be an integrated water and electricity project if it was to be it's baby. This is because its very difficult to envision sufficient revenue for Tuaspring ( based on the PPP handbook guideline 2.3.3) since a very large percentage of its revenue is dependent on the USEP price of electricity which is market driven and PUB has no control over. EMA would have been a better fit for the job.

How then did PUB, when it awarded Tuaspring,  justify that Tuaspring would have sufficient revenue to cover investment and cost according to 2.3.3 of the PPP handbook? 

Putting it another way, it was wrong of whoever that arrowed PUB instead of EMA to award this integrated, predominantly power project. Or at the very least that whoever should have placed the integrated Tuaspring as a baby of  both PUB and EMA to make sure they collaborated.

It seems to me that without EMA having any responsibilities for Tuaspring, the electricity market was allowed to go into excess, 80% of electricity reserve instead of the target 30% of electricity reserve. 

Contrary to what some people say that it is only due to management incompetence, i would beg to differ since the whole electricity industry are facing losses or very low profitability, so its an industry wide malaise that could only be caused by a regulatory failure.

This reminded me of the question asked during the MOF consultation process in 2004. It is currently enshrined under the list of FAQs on MOF website.

How did the Ministry of Finance ensure that the public agencies work closely together in this Tuaspring project? Your guess is a good as mine.

And by the way, MOF has modeled the PPP model after UK. 

Similar to the concept of UK PPP taskforce, there is a unit within MOF that creates awareness of PPP, handles PPP policy and provides guidance on PPP matters. 

                                                                                                  - point 17 on MOF FAQ

Guess what has happened in the UK PPP model now according to this article released in 2017.

It is indeed a blow to the reputation of Singapore in its quest to be Asia's Infrastructure Hub especially when 60% of Hyflux's revenue is from the Singapore government.

And another blow to the reputation of Singapore in another of its quest to be the regional Debt Restructuring Hub if the restructuring of Hyflux fails.

The stakes are too just too high.

Further reading

1) Considerations about Hyflux
2) The fate of Hyflux
3)Will Hyflux recover? The billion dollar question
4) Hyflux-Treatmeat of perpetual share holders- Ezion
5) Hyflux - loans and borrowings - Pacific Radiance
6)A happy ending for retail perpertual securities holders - Tiger Air and Hyflux
7) The Very Curious Case of Sharebuybacks- Hyflux
8)What did the founder/Chairwoman/CEO do to help hyflux throughout the years
9) Moving forwards at the Townhall meetings with Hyflux - Part 1
10) Moving forward at the Townhall meeting with Hyflux - Part 2
11)The Lucky Accredited Investors of Hyflux's Perpetual Securities - Part 3
12) The Peculiar Case of HyfluxShop - Question 12 
13)Uncovering the Real Motivations Behind the HyfluxShop 
14) High Level Staff Movement Indication of Red Flags -Hyflux
15)An industry comparison of Hyflux compared with its peers - Question 15
16)What other Water Companies did that Hyflux didn't - Question 16
17)Why a debt to equity option for retail investors is not right
18) Consolidated Questions For Hyflux Townhall Meeting on 19 and 20 July 2018 - Hyflux
19)Consolidated Questions For Hyflux Townhall Meeting on 19 and 20 July 2018 - Hyflux- continued
20)Informal Steering Committee for the Reorganisation Process - Hyflux
21) What happened to other Debt Restructuring Exercises - Ausgroup
22)What happened to other Debt Restructuring Exercises - Nam Cheong
23) My layman views of the so-called " White Knights of Hyflux"
24) The Unsecured Working Group (UWG) are against the retail investors - Hyflux
25)Where to find money to pay back retail investors? 
26)What happened at Hyflux's Second Townhall Meeting
27) Another bomb to the retail investors of Hyflux
28)The Underrated Importance of Regulatory Risk - Hyflux
29)The Overlooked Importance of Another Regulatory Risk - Hyflux
30)Why did so many Singaporeans invest in Hyflux - The positive image illusion
31)On Why The Rich Get Richer And Poor Gets Poorer - The Hyflux Proposal is Out!
32)The " not spoken much" dirty little thing about the Restructuring Proposal - the $33 million - Hyflux